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Police pay – contested and contestable 
Roger Seifert1 and Kim Mather2 
Abstract: 
This paper provides an analysis of developments in the determination of police pay. It reveals 
the contested nature of public sector pay setting where the government of the day is given 
to short-term economic goals over and above any long-term approach to resolving staffing 
issues in the essential public services. In the case of the police, the Police Federation of 
England and Wales (PFEW) has traditionally used both industrial and political methods to 
put pressure on key government decision-makers. Developments reveal increasingly fraught 
relations between the police and the government, with the 2008 pay dispute in particular 
remarking a key point of deterioration in this set of relations. Once it became clear after the 
2010 general election that the government would ignore industrial pressure then the PFEW 
felt driven to increase the activities of its political arm. This ultimately backfired with 
Plebgate leaving them naked in the negotiating chamber. 
 
Introduction 
In 2008 and again in 2012 police officers belonging to the Police Federation of England and 
Wales (PFEW) marched through the streets of London in protest at government interference 
with their pay levels, pensions, and pay setting system. Their anger and sense of betrayal 
was clear. The protests were part of an organised campaign by the Federation which 
included a series of local campaigns against cuts, civilianisation, and privatisation.  It 
culminated in an indicative ballot of Federation members in early 2013 concerning the 
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restoration of the right to strike,  the Plebgate affair (Normington 2014), and the 
government’s decision to set up a Police Remuneration  Review Body (PRRB) late in 2014 
(Home Office 2013). 
 
Our aim is to show how these developments provide a clear example of public sector pay 
setting problems when the government of the day pursues short-term economic goals at 
the expense of any longer term planned approach to staffing public services. This has 
resulted in times of inflation with a typical shark-tooth outcome when pay falls steadily 
behind others and then has a sudden catch-up deal, to be followed by another gradual 
decline in relative pay. When inflation is low, as since 2010, then public sector pay is 
clamped and the preferred mechanisms for pay determination have little to distinguish 
themselves from each other - indexation, Whitley, pay review, and ‘free’ collective 
bargaining. Thus workers fight back using industrial action or pressure groups tactics. In the 
case of the police the latter prevails through the use of propaganda, demonstrations, 
threats of corruption to come, and public protection risks. 
 
The paper provides a schematic history of Whitley-style national pay setting for the police 
from the 1919 strike to its crisis in 1977. Thereafter a system of indexation and national 
bargaining prevailed until that too broke down in 2005 when both the index itself and the 
government’s approach to arbitration collapsed. That presaged a major dispute in 2008 
followed by five years of uncertainty and ‘bad faith’ negotiations.  Our argument is that the 
2008 dispute over police pay in England and Wales was a major turning point, with the 
decision to phase a pay settlement agreed by the main parties and ratified by the Police 
Negotiating Board (PNB) thereby thwarting the custom and practice of limited direct 
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government interference. This, we suggest, weakened an already fraught trust relationship 
between rank-and-file officers in the PFEW and SPF3 and the government and was made 
much worse by the recommendations of the 2011/12 Winsor report alongside the Hutton 
changes to pensions (2011).  By 2013 the government had re-calibrated its position and 
opted for setting up the PRRB.  
 
Some of the key elements of the debate include the historic decision to prevent the police 
from striking and therefore from being involved in ‘normalised’ collective bargaining and 
this is further compounded by not being allowed to join an independent trade union. This 
link between not being able to strike, and therefore only being involved in a stunted form of 
collective bargaining, and the need for a secure arbitral system has been taken very 
seriously by the Federations and their members. Any breach of that trust in arbitration 
raises a question mark over the whole pay setting regime, while casting further doubts on 
the mutual gains nature of the outcomes (Kochan and Osterman 1994).  
 
As the paper argues, in all of this the representatives of the police4 and the government 
have between them devised a series of mechanisms to decide pay and related matters, 
regularly reformed, but now coming under immense pressure. The point is that the special 
employment situation of sworn warranted officers (constables) and the ban on police 
officers from belonging to a trade union and going on strike (Judge, 1994) has not 
fundamentally altered police attitudes to their pay as workers. The issues on pay 
determination when the state is the main employer of specialist labour are familiar from the 
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perspective of the workforce, namely concerns with the basic rate for the job allied with 
overtime, increments, allowances, and pensions. 
 
The main research methods used for this paper involved interviews with PFEW and SPF 
national and local leaders and activists; participative observation at meetings including 
PFEW National Executive; PFEW and SPF national annual conferences; PNB staff side; and 
other sectional meetings as with the sergeants groups’ and the West Midlands joint group. 
The analysis of government, employers’, and federation documents also formed part of the 
research programme.  
 
The case is made that, ceteris paribus, the state, acting as the sole employer (monopsony) 
for the police, will push down wages (and pensions and other associated costs of 
employment) when it can (in a recession) creating a crisis (Hall and Vanderporten 1977). The 
crisis manifests itself in a breakdown of trust as between the police and the representatives 
of government, and this in turn might reflexively become part of a further breakdown as 
between the police and the citizens.  
 
This matters as the police are charged with protecting the public from harm through 
controlling crime and disorder. Such principles were outlined by Robert Peel in the 1820s 
(Hansard vol. XXI, George IV series, p. 867, April 1829) when he established the first modern 
police force (Lentz and Chaires 2007). Peel based his programme on classical studies of the 
state updated by Renaissance writers such as Machiavelli (1513) and influenced by the early 
utilitarians.  Its central tenets included policing with public consent to keep the public from 
harm, the prevention of crime and disorder, and with efficiency measured through the 
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absence of crime and disorder rather than visible evidence of police action itself (Critchley 
1978: 47-51; Taylor 1997:12-39).  
 
Nonetheless, police officers are essentially state workers (in uniform) at work with the 
associated concerns of any such group. They rely on the police federations acting as 
pressure groups because what people “want to achieve, individually or in groups, now 
mainly depends on the state’s sanction and support. But since that sanction and support are 
not bestowed indiscriminately, they must, ever more directly, seek to influence and shape 
the state’s power and purpose” (Miliband 1973:3). One police function under capitalism is 
to produce social order so that the main business of making profits can be continued. It is 
the defence of private property at all costs that provides the modern state elites with both 
their main policy direction, and their determinant ideological disposition (Cohen 1988:298). 
These principles in part illustrate the wider role of the police as part of the state apparatus, 
but in a liberal democracy based on policing with public support. If and when trust is broken 
as between the police and the public due to corruption and/or partial incompetence and/or 
clear evidence of partiality, and linked with this, if trust is broken between sections of the 
state elites (central and local government of the day, PCCs5, and Chief Constables) and rank-
and-file police then a crisis of policing is the most likely outcome (Seifert 2012). 
Within all of this national pay determination is a central plank that links fairness and felt-fair 
comparability sensitivities of the police with absence of corruption, national performance 
standards, and public and political trust. The trade union principle that a worker should be 
paid the ‘rate for the job’ expresses the overwhelming sentiment that doing the job is the 
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main purpose of going to work. As a result the vast majority of police officers feel that they 
should be paid for doing their job to nationally agreed standards based on national training 
precepts, and that performance should be rewarded by promotion, specialisms by 
recognised and agreed extra payments, loyalty and experience by increments, extra hours 
by overtime and special one-off payments, and regional cost-of-living by a national rate that 
covers all reasonable ‘necessaries of life’ (PFEW, March 2015).  
‘Fair pay’ under Whitley in the time of centralisation 1919-1977: 
Prior to 1919 each Police Force determined police officers’ pay locally. In 1919 the famous 
strike by police (Judge and Reynolds 1968; Bean 1980) forced the Government of the day to 
ban them from striking. In so doing they were also forced to find a way to determine pay 
and conditions that would be acceptable to police and public. The strike by the National 
Union of Police and Prison Officers over union recognition was part of a wider strike 
movement, and as AJP Taylor ironically notes “the strikes were not only alarming in 
themselves --- particularly the unparalleled display of working-class feeling by the guardians 
of public order” (1965: 106). 
 
As a result the Desborough Committee (1919) was set up and recommended a unified 
approach to pay, pensions and conditions and introduced a national pay scale based on 
length of service. The resultant Police Act of 1919 outlawed strikes and the union, and 
established the PFEW and SPF as the sole legitimate collective representation of police 
officers in what became known as the federated ranks (those below superintendent). These 
federations were effectively post-entry closed shops, but could never in themselves be 
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counted as trade unions despite mimicking many of the representative and bargaining 
functions associated with unions. 
 
From 1919 to 1977 a Whitley Council approach was adopted with two statutory Police 
Councils, one for England and Wales and the other for Scotland. In each case, 
representatives from the Official (Employer) Side and Staff Side provided advice on police 
pay and conditions to the Secretaries of State who had overall responsibility for determining 
police officer pay. The Whitley Council mutual gains approach continued to operate for over 
fifty years before a further series of reforms and reports created the current crisis. 
 
Soon after World War Two the Oaksey (1946-1948) review of police conditions of service 
recommended a non-statutory negotiating body for the police, and proposed the creation of 
a new Police Council with an independent Chair and joint secretariats established by each 
side. This was a genuine looking negotiating body responsible for making recommendations 
on basic pay, overtime, incremental scales, allowances, expenses, hours and leave. It was 
supplemented by Advisory Boards dealing with non-negotiable matters such as training and 
discipline. This proved to be only a temporary solution and as a result the Willink Royal 
Commission (1962) on the police was set up in 1960 with wide terms of reference, the 
fourth of which covered the broad principles which should govern the remuneration of the 
constable, having regard to the nature and extent of police duties and responsibilities and 
need to attract and retain sufficient recruits with the proper qualifications. These reports 
were used to formulate the Police Act 1964 through which the new Police Council and the 
Police Advisory Boards secured their statutory authority. Crucially the Commission 
recommended a pay negotiation formula to recognise the fact that police had no right to 
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strike. Thus the system embodied the norms of other public sector pay setting 
arrangements with the case for increased pay made by representative bodies based on cost-
of-living, comparability, performance, affordability, and the state of the labour market 
arguments. 
 
Indexation in the time of inflation 1977-2005:  
In the mid-1970s there was high inflation, wage controls through the Social Contract, and 
significant levels of industrial militancy. The police were caught up in this mood as their pay 
levels fell further behind. Consequently the negotiating system broke down and the 
Federations withdrew from the Police Council. This led in August 1977 to the appointment 
of a Review Body on Police Negotiating Machinery, chaired by Lord Edmund-Davies, which 
recommended the establishment of the Police Negotiating Board (PNB), with a Chair and 
deputy independent of the Sides. The role of the Chair was to “provide continuity and to 
supply a neutral voice in negotiation” (Cmnd. 7283 para 89:30).  The independent chair and 
deputy were also to be responsible for arranging or undertaking conciliation in the event of 
a failure to agree by the Sides. An independent secretariat was also introduced to provide 
knowledge and expertise through the Office of Manpower Economics (OME). All of this was 
consolidated in the Police Negotiating Board Act 1980, and subsequently updated in the 
Police Act 1996. 
      
Of note is that Edmund-Davies addressed specifically the relationship between the 
machinery of negotiation and the absence of the right to strike. The report stated: “Such an 
important limitation on the freedom of action of members of the police force renders it 
even more essential that the machinery for determining police pay and other conditions of 
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service commands the confidence of all sections of the service” (cited in Randall 2006:11). 
This follows the precepts of the more general Priestley Report (1955) into the basis of fair 
pay in the state sector, and more recent ILO principles on the right to freely associate and 
collectively bargain (ILO 1998). 
 
At the heart of the Edmund Davies Inquiry was the proposed indexing of Police Officers’ pay 
to movements in the Average Earnings Index for the whole economy. This followed on from 
Lord McCarthy’s report on firefighter pay after the 1977 national strike, which also 
recommended pay indexation (modified in 1984), and that also ended after a bitter dispute 
in 2002 (Seifert and Sibley 2005). The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Police 
(Cmnd. 7283, July 1978) confirmed many of the existing pay arrangements for police 
officers. For example, it re-affirmed the appropriateness of a collective bargaining system of 
pay determination (rather than a pay review body) and of arbitration through a separate 
Police Arbitration Tribunal (PAT) in cases of an irreconcilable failure to agree. It also 
recommended a significant increase in basic pay, and a new formula in which pay scales for 
the federated and superintending ranks would be updated annually on 1 September in 
accordance with  reflecting changes in the index of average earnings in the previous twelve 
months. It proposed that national rates of pay should continue to apply throughout the UK 
(with regional or force allowances only for London and Northern Ireland), that new national 
pay scales should be established, and that there should be no change in the existing system 
of rent allowance. Not surprisingly this report tends to form the basis of the Federations’ 
arguments whenever police pay systems and structures are challenged (Bartel and Lewin 
1981; Feuille and Delaney 1986; Ichniowski et al. 1989; Hunter 2003). 
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The rationale for the PNB is therefore firmly based on the premise that the pay, allowances, 
hours of duty, leave and pensions of UK police officers are best determined by negotiation 
and agreement between representatives of the “employers” and of the officers themselves. 
Five linked features of the negotiating arrangements give the PNB its distinctive character. 
First, the unique role of the police officer brings with it responsibilities which are generally 
held to be incompatible with the withdrawal of labour. Second, agreements negotiated in 
the PNB are recommendations to the Secretaries of State, who are obliged by law to take 
them into account before making any decision. Third, matters on which the sides are unable 
to agree can be referred, jointly or unilaterally, to binding arbitration by a three-person 
tribunal (PAT), which operates independently from the PNB under the auspices of ACAS. PAT 
decisions are deemed to be agreements of the PNB. Fourth, the annual pay uplift is 
determined by a formula linked to pay movements in the wider economy. Finally, the PNB 
has an "independent element" composed of a chair, deputy chair and secretariat. 
 
A further change arose from the 1993 Sheehy Report that examined the rank structure, 
remuneration and conditions of the police service, and recommended a link to pay 
settlements rather than average earnings. It proposed using the OME survey of private 
sector non-manual settlements data, which was widely used at the time to inform 
negotiations on civil servants’ pay. Consequently, from 1994 the OME figure for the median 
of total pay settlements has been used to determine the annual police pay uplift. Other 
changes implemented following the Sheehy Report included: abolition of rent/housing 
allowance for new recruits; freezing of rent/housing allowance for existing recipients; and 
the introduction of fixed term contracts for ranks above chief superintendent. This led to 
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ten years of an uneasy truce as between ministers and the police federations. That all ended 
in 2005.  
 
By 2005 the OME was raising serious technical concerns around the continued use of the 
pay survey, including the survey’s coverage, the reliability of its results, and the difficulty of 
distinguishing between manual and non-manual workers and base and total pay. By this 
stage, the police were the only organisation still using the survey as the basis for setting pay 
so perhaps unsurprisingly OME indicated that it could not recommend its continued use. An 
IDS Pay report (2006) notes a median increase of 3% to June 2006 but then observes that 
Home Office officials and management representatives refused to agree the 3% increase at 
the July PNB meeting.  So, “this was the first time since 1979 that the annual pay increase 
was not ratified” (Keter, 2011:3). No agreement was reached at a conciliation meeting held 
on 21 August 2006. An arbitration hearing followed and finally in October 2006 the PAT 
found in favour of the Staff Side claim, and recommended the 3% award. 
 
As this crisis developed so the Randall Report (2006) into the negotiating system rejected a 
pay review body without much consideration. In so doing it failed to critically assess the 
needs of the police force given the proposed modernisation and mergers, it seemed 
unaware of what was happening elsewhere in the public sector, and it was confused about 
the exact nature and role of the federations. Moreover it was not clear on the differences 
between consultation and negotiation, and those between conciliation and arbitration. The 
report also failed to examine the mandatory nature of the bargaining outcomes; disputes 
resolution procedures; the employment status of the constable; the relationship of national 
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conditions of service with national pay determination models; and aspects of the machinery 
itself.  
 
Pay reform in the time of uncertainty 2006 -2013: 
The use and abuse of arbitration now emerged centre stage reflecting the tendency of the 
government of the day to push down on all public sector pay (Nickell and Quintini 2002) 
despite the known impact on worker performance (Brown and Nolan 1988). This meant that 
those unable to defend themselves through industrial action had to rely on the fairness and 
openness of the arbitration process.  General models of arbitrator behaviour (Ashenfelter 
and Bloom 1984) applied to the police (Delaney et al. 1986) and contrasted with the effects 
of collective bargaining (Zhao and Lovrich 1997) show the difficulties when state employees 
fall out with government decision-makers able to interfere with the mediation and/or 
arbitration process.  
 
Meanwhile another review into police pay soon followed in 2007 attacking indexation and 
underlining the political imperative to resolve the ‘problem’ of police pay:  
 “The  Home Office set out their criteria for an effective machinery to determine  pay 
 and conditions consistent with the Government’s current public sector pay 
 policy … [they noted] that effective pay systems should be flexible—the ability to 
 reflect a wide range of factors and changing circumstances. The Government view 
 is that the current indexation arrangements do not meet  these objectives and are 
 essentially contrary to economic policy, which is underpinned by flexible labour 
 markets and the exposure of each workforce or organisation to its own set of 
 market considerations. The Government go on to reason that if a large section of the 
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 UK workforce were to have their pay rises indexed to the pay rises of other 
 workers, this would severely undermine macroeconomic flexibility, which has 
 been the cornerstone of the UK’s economic success in the last decade. Finally, the 
 Government argue that indexation delivers an automatic award, thereby  removing 
 the incentives for workforce reform and efficiency improvements (Tony  McNulty 
 MP6 cited  in Booth 2007, p. 15). 
 
 On the face of it there appeared to be a case for pay review, not least in terms of offering a 
pragmatic way forward for the government in the face of failures in the indexation system 
and the need to put police pay on a less conflictual footing. This has needs to be understood 
in the context of reasons behind the shift in government policy to a co-ordinated suite of 
permanent review bodies: first, the need of central government to control the public sector 
pay bill while avoiding ; second, the need of central government to avoid  public sector 
disputes; second, , third, the incorporation of the five pay arguments into an institutional 
format; and third, fourth, to maintain credibility and legality through a form of mediation 
and/or arbitration based on an extension of the practice of collective bargaining – being fair 
and being seen to be fair within general principles of social equity as well as anti-
discriminatory legislation (White, 2000). Importantly, PRBs also “give the impression that 
the government is an interested bystander, allowing it to avoid being drawn (on the face of 
it) into potentially messy employment relations issues while being able to exercise strong 
influence” (Williams, 2014: 217). Those organizations involved with PRB benefit from the 
institutional formalisation of the arrangements and the high profile reporting of outcomes. 
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However they also suffer from lack of member interest, a loss of accountability, and of 
accusations of being too close to government and the employers (White and Hackett 2003).  
 
The best view remains that they are a form of mediation: the PRB members hear the 
evidence separately, consider it in private, and recommend an outcome designed to meet 
the main concerns of the parties and thereby meet with their approval. In all cases this is 
mediation rather than arbitration, because the recommendations are subject to scrutiny 
and approval by government ministers and are not in themselves final or binding. Once the 
government has spoken, whether to support or alter the recommendations, then the 
outcomes are binding on all parties in the same way as they would be in normal arbitration. 
But of course either side in extremis can repudiate the outcome and the process, except for 
the armed forces. 
 
In 2007 the PFEW decided it preferred the current indexation system to any proposed pay 
review. It adopted a policy based on a general critique of pay review bodies because “on 
balance, the government has gained more from PRBs than the parties in terms of process 
and outcomes, and that generally the employers have done better, especially since the mid-
1990s, than the staff side” (Seifert, 2007:1). In addition, the PFEW argued that PRBs had 
become a key mechanism by which government could directly control pay and conditions of 
service and as such, were inextricably tied up with the government’s broader 
‘modernization’ objectives. As Seifert observes, PRBs potentially facilitated “moves to local 
pay, performance pay, skill mix change associated with ‘civilianisation’, and scope for a 
flexible labour management strategies based on the re-introduction of police force mergers 
in some form” (ibid). Moreover, PRBs afford opportunities for the government to undertake 
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a more systematic analysis of issues such as affordability, recruitment and retention, 
morale, and job roles (Williams, 2014).  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, senior activists and leaders of the PFEW all opposed pay review 
at the time. As Song noted:  “generally, they think that a pay review body does not bring the 
right amount of fairness into the pay negotiation machinery. Instead they feel threatened 
that the pay review body might take the existing independent element away from the 
current system. The government will gain more control over pay bargaining and that will put 
the staff side in a very disadvantaged position” (2008:32). Sergeant Paul Mckeever (later to 
become PFEW Chair) expressed similar concerns. He was deeply mistrustful of any move to 
pay review, largely on account of the potential for the government to gain further pay 
control while unravelling notions of fairness and equity that he felt were the underpinning 
principles of indexation:  
“although we can take things to the PNB at the moment with this particular 
government who are very centrist in their attitudes towards pay negotiations it 
makes it very difficult for us to achieve a fair outcome … I can’t see much strength in 
it at all at the moment apart from the fact that we have an indexation that is fair and 
equitable but clearly that is something that they want to change.” 
 
 Another leading activist, Constable Simon Reed (later to become Vice-Chair, PFEW) added:  
 “If they bring the police review body in I think they must understand that there are 
 some very angry police officers in the country … To hear police officers talking 
 about  potential strike action is something that hasn’t been on the agenda for 
 certainly 30 years back to the 1970’s when police officers were talking in that 
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 manner. For police officers to be talking about going on strike is an enormous step 
 for them to take. It’s actually unlawful for us to go on strike in this country, it’s not 
 something that we can do and we can actually go to prison for it, so it shows the 
 strength of feeling against the way that we’ve been treated and the 
 government are going to have to be careful about that.”  
His comments reveal the sense of grievance among rank and file officers about the prospect 
of a move to pay review. The government faced a dilemma – while PRBs offered in theory 
the means to avoid a public sector dispute, they were equally concerned to avoid taking on 
the PFEW.  
 
Meanwhile the crisis over police pay deepened when on 14 January 2008 MPs, effectively 
briefed by the PFEW,  expressed real concern over government policy to stage, rather than 
fully implement the PNB pay recommendation. The Home Secretary was attacked from all 
sides and Bob Russell, Liberal Democrat MP summed up the general feelings: “The Home 
Secretary must accept that the Government's refusal to honour in full the independently 
recommended pay award has caused considerable damage to police morale”. The Home 
Secretary, Jacqui Smith defended this policy position in terms of affordability: “I had a 
responsibility to make a decision that was right for policing, for the affordability of policing 
and for the taxpayer. It was also right that that decision should be in line with the publicly 
stated pay policy and the Government's commitment to keep inflation under control”  (HC 
Debate, vol. 470,col.w635). 
 
On 23 January 2008 the government and the police could not have been further apart. 
While the Prime Minister PM told the Commons: “People understand that in the fight 
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against inflation it was necessary to stage public sector pay awards ... if pay rises are wiped 
out by ever-rising inflation, no benefit will go to the police or anybody else who receives 
those pay rises” (HC Debate, vol.470, col.w1495), an estimated 22,500 police officers 
marched in central London in a protest over pay. A rally at Central Hall in Westminster, 
consisting of 3,500 officers, was followed by Jan Berry, Chair PFEW, presenting a petition to 
Downing Street. She commented following her meeting with the Home Secretary, "The talks 
were certainly more constructive than my last meeting with her, which I would describe as 
being pretty acrimonious." She added:  
 "We recognise that we need to move on at some stage but … there's still  some 
 unfinished business for how we've been treated. And for us to be able to enter 
 into negotiations in the future, we've got to trust the people that we're going to be 
 negotiating with. And that trust is going to have to be rebuilt because it's been 
 broken”. 
The key point to emerge from this protracted period of pay disarray is that in the final 
analysis, the government were not prepared to override the PFEW, the PFEW were deeply 
resistant to any enforced changes, and the status quo indexation system prevailed 
notwithstanding its failings on both sides. However in the process, the concepts of felt-fair 
comparability, fairness and trust were lost.  
By 2010 the police pay system was in meltdown. Both Labour and Coalition governments 
were overwhelmingly concerned to reduce the pay bill through a combination of initiatives 
that de facto were intent on breaking perceived restrictive practices and costly pay 
arrangements: changes to pensions and retirement age; reduction in the system of overtime 
and allowances; attacks on national pay systems and the repeated quest for regional pay; 
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direct government intervention in pay settlements; skill reprofiling with the substitution of 
less well-paid PCSOs for warranted officers; and a reconfiguration of the relations between 
the Federations and the employers at national and force level. The PFEW were opposed to 
all of these measures.  
 
These general developments also have to be considered in the context of wider (and 
ongoing) police reforms since the early noughties, with controversial efforts at force 
mergers (O’Connor 2005); the widespread introduction in England of PCSOs (Audit 
Commission 2010: 33-48); the renewed emphasis on management and leadership (Neyroud, 
2011); and the election of PCCs that alters the nature of police accountability in England and 
Wales (other than for the Metropolitan force) and of the management of the police budget. 
This is itself set against a background of changing police priorities, a mixture of anti-
terrorism, the fight against organised crime, the ‘bobby on the beat’ visibility debate (Home 
Office 2004; PFEW 2004), and the control of public (dis)order. 
Introduced into this mix was yet another attempt to reform police pay when the coalition 
government asked Tom Winsor to investigate. His government-sponsored reports (2011 (a), 
(b); 2012) recommended that Chief Constables, within strict limits set by the central state, 
had a more or less free hand to decide pay with the abolition of increments, the reduction 
of most allowances, the restriction of overtime, and the use of promotion as tool of 
management control rather than reward for long and excellent service. The reports 
favoured a top-down model of management with all powers to the senior ranks; a reduced 
role for the PFEW/SPF through consultation and negotiation; a move away from national 
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standards and national pay; and a substantial reduction in the number of warranted officers 
in favour of civilians.  
The Winsor analysis represents a clear and recent manifestation of the contested 
relationship as between government ministers and the PFEW concerning what are  
perceived to be harmful (and inflexible) restrictive practices, especially with regard to time 
utilisation and overtime. This is brought into sharp relief during times of budgetary 
pressures. The desire of senior police officers and the government to ‘buy out’ these so-
called restrictive practices, especially with regard to overtime shift premia was evident in 
the Winsor Report (2012 vol.2 part 2:562). This recommended the abolition of overtime, 
was supported by ACPO7, and was opposed by the PFEW (ibid:567).  The perennial issues 
underpinning this debate centre on a complex cluster of competing arguments presented by 
ministers, service managers, and the PFEW: that some officers become dependent on 
overtime; that the total overtime paybill gets out of control; that overtime is used as a 
substitute for employing more staff; and that some officers can actually earn much more 
than others through these mechanisms.  
Other central issues to proposed changes in police pay at that time were linked to 
substantial changes to the relevant technologies in use, not least the links between police 
on the front line and the backroom staff. The use of ‘body worn’ cameras, first mooted in 
2007, is one development that the PFEW has since cautiously welcomed on account of the 
perceived benefits (for police officers) of having camera-based evidence of incidents (Police 
Federation News, 2015). 
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One of the main aims of Winsor was to end national collective bargaining over pay and 
conditions. This is an avowed government policy throughout all services including the NHS, 
education, local government, and the civil service. The reasons have been made clear in 
earlier documents: governments see national collective bargaining as expensive, as giving 
too much power (as they see it) to bodies representing the workforce, and as a barrier to 
privatisation, marketisation, and in the case of the police,  civilianisation (Mather and 
Seifert, 2013). As the Chancellor of the Exchequer made clear: “we are asking the 
independent pay review bodies to consider how public sector pay can be made more 
responsive to local labour markets” (HC Hansard 29/11/11 col 802, George Osborne). 
 
The main case made then by the PFEW against the break-up of national pay systems 
remains – as one PFEW representative (sergeants’ group) explained, “there are no 
advantages in this. Local or regional negotiations would increase the costs of negotiating, 
would be very divisive and would work against ‘the common role’ of the police officer. It 
would also cause recruitment and retention problems as police move around chasing better 
pay”. The general PFEW argument is that national pay bargaining provides a vital link to 
national standards of service delivery; they remain transparent and simple to understand; 
they are the fairest way to pay everyone; they are neither divisive nor diversionary; they 
allow a proper voice to representative bodies; they focus government and public attention 
on the nature and system of police pay which allows for a national debate on this matter; 
and they create the basis for a properly paid basic rate from constable to chief constable 
reducing reliance on overtime and allowances, thus allowing for police officers to plan their 
careers, their lives, and their retirements in the full knowledge that a life time of public 
service will be justly acknowledged and rewarded. It also prevents poaching between forces, 
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and is pay for the job done irrespective of where, when and with whom. When confronted 
with Winsor’s recommendations, PFEW representatives’ comments clearly captured the 
attitudes of police officers to their pay as workers:  
  
 “changes in shift working need to be dealt with as part of our pay. Our terms and 
 conditions cover this so messing with shifts means messing with our pay  and that’s 
 not on”. 
 
 “Reducing overtime is not an option and it’s unfair to compare us with the 
 other public services. It’s not fair either to talk about pay disparities between us and 
 the PCSOs – we don’t care”.  
 
“Previously Mrs May promised to always back us and to support us. These were 
clearly just hollow words; meaningless soundbites in her early months in office … 
[she] has forced the hand of police officers across England and Wales to call for a 
ballot on whether they want industrial rights. They no longer have any trust or faith 
in the Home Secretary or this government." (McKeever, 27/3/12, PFEW circular). 
 
There was also strong opposition to any element of performance-based pay: 
 
  “It’s got to stay as it is with a competency-based threshold. We’re not giving this 
 up”.  
 
  “There are no ‘hard to fill’ posts so the argument for introducing PRP is  rubbish”. 
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 “Attacks on our pay really mean that the cuts are being made ‘bottom-up”.  
 
 “There seems to be a trade-off between police numbers, standards and 
 incremental pay costs”.  
 
These comments underline the contested and indeed the protracted debate over police pay. 
As we have noted, the state acts as the sole purchaser of police officer labour which means, 
ceteris paribus, that the state will seek to push down pay levels to the very minimum. The 
mitigating factor is that in those times when pay was very low then there was a greater 
tendency to corruption and a greater tendency to employ incompetent staff 
(Gorodnichenko and Peter, 2007). This was also recognised in the findings of the landmark 
Priestley Committee (1955) into public sector employment, and the line taken was that pay 
must be decided on a fair basis. This could only be sustained on two principles: first, pay 
must be negotiated nationally between representatives of employers and employees; 
second, the principles of pay bargaining must prevail, namely arguments based on the five 
areas already mentioned in this paper – comparability; cost-of-living; affordability; 
productivity; and labour market issues (Disney and Gosling 1998; 2008). If this is adhered to 
then the interests of the employers (central and local, and devolved governments) and of 
the employees (police officers) are best met and matched.  
 
On that basis some form of national collective bargaining is the sine qua non of the system. 
This is the general position of the TUC, ACAS, the ILO, and the PFEW and SPF. The practice of 
the moment is a mixture of indexation, pay review, and Whitley. This arises because the 
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police cannot strike unlike doctors and nurses, teachers, and most other public sector 
workers. The right to strike allows bargaining to be full and frank with both arbitration and 
industrial action as part of the bargaining process. 
 
A pay freeze, a pension cut, and across the board reduction in collective voice, bargaining 
rights, and pay allowances brought the service and the federation to the brink of revolt. This 
opens the door to backstairs mergers, privatisation, regionalisation, civilianisation, 
‘Plebgate’, and the inability to meet Peel’s core principles. Such a threat causes concern as 
to the immediate impact on policing both locally and with regard to terrorism and serious 
organised crime. It also rings alarm bells about future recruitment and retention of police 
officers, alongside the historic and international tendency for corruption to spread as pay 
falls, collective voice fails, and disillusionment spreads. Some police officers we interviewed 
made these points clearly enough:  “a lot of the officers already have debts. Personally, I’m 
worried about returning to corruption”. 
 
The end game in the time of stagnation? 
Such was the anger and frustration among PFEW members that the Home Secretary was 
barracked at the May 2012 PFEW annual conference after another mass demonstration in 
London. The Guardian headline for 10 May 2012 ran: ‘Police officers march in protest 
against cuts’. And continued: ‘More than 30,000 police officers from across the UK 
demonstrate against police reforms, budget cuts and pay cuts.… Some officers wore T-shirts 
demanding full industrial rights.” Likewise, the Police Magazine for June 2012 was keen to 
emphasise the historic nature of this protest march, noting that it “should make the 
government sit up and listen”. At the same time, Paul McKeever, chair of the PFEW drew 
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explicit links between over 5,000 frontline job losses and the potential compromise over 
public safety.  Simon Reed, vice-chair, added the cuts “are hitting the service we provide to 
the public and the government are not listening to us – this is what the march is all 
about”.  This march was essentially a visible manifestation of a collectivised group of 
workers who felt sufficiently aggrieved to take to the streets.  
 
PFEW leaders and activists became increasingly frustrated by their inability to make 
progress in their opposition to the Winsor report recommendations on pay and terms and 
conditions. The limitations of their powers as a political pressure group were apparent as 
the government refused to compromise and, given their lack of industrial options, the PFEW 
became desperate to find a negotiating chip. This appeared to be handed to them out of the 
blue when Andrew Mitchell MP (the government’s chief whip) had a row when police 
officers refused to allow him to cycle through a gate at Downing Street. They claimed he 
swore at them and called them “plebs”. This was on the 19th September 2012 at the height 
of the dispute over Winsor. When the news broke the next day some in the PFEW saw this 
as their chance to attack the government, and Mitchell was forced to resign on 19th October 
2012. The scandal rumbled on, but by the end of 2013 the officers involved and the 
Federation representatives at the centre of the storm had been discredited for giving false 
information.  
 
The storm surrounding Plebgate effectively put the PFEW leadership on the back foot but 
was even more devastating to the organisation because other changes were being mooted. 
These included, inter alia, changes to traditional promotion through the ranks through 
direct-entry recruits, efforts to abolish overtime and unsocial hours’ payments, the 
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introduction of a Pay Review Body, the challenges of significant new technologies, and the 
ending of a range of other ‘restrictive practices’. These added up to the most substantial and 
robust attacks on the traditional craft-based police jobs faced by the PFEW since the 1960s. 
By now the government had had enough. They decided to establish unilaterally a police pay 
review body and did so on the back of the 2013 pay settlement. The PNB reached 
agreement on the implementation of changes to the pay scales for constables who joined 
the service prior to the 1 April 2013 and for sergeants (PNB circular 2013/14 revised). It was 
agreed that changes to the constables’ pay scale would take place in three stages over two 
years from the 1 April 2014. Pay points 6, 7 and 9 would be removed in April 2014, 2015 and 
2016 respectively. It was also agreed that pay point 0 on the sergeants’ pay scale would be 
removed from the 1 April 2014.  
The Home Secretary, Theresa May, wrote to David Lebrecht (chair of the newly formed 
Police Remuneration Review Body) on 3 November 2014, setting out the government’s 
intentions when noting: “I am confident that you help deliver pay and conditions that are 
not only fair to police officers, but are fair to the public as well”. This confidence was based 
on her setting the direction of travel for the ‘independent’ body to include, inter alia, “the 
need to ensure that the proposals reflect the Government’s policy on public sector pay for 
average awards in 2015/16 of up to 1%”; and “the government’s continued commitment to 
maximising flexibility for chief constables and Police and Crime Commissioners to manage 
their workforce in the most efficient way possible at local level”. Other conditions included 
that proposals must be “affordable” and that police officers would remain unable to join a 
trade union and were prohibited from going on strike. 
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This position was outlined in more detail by the Home Office’s own evidence to the PRRB. It 
included a justification for the setting up of the body:   “the Winsor Review found the PRB 
system for negotiating pay and allowances to be cumbersome, inefficient and adversarial … 
since 2006 the PNB had failed to agree in a timely manner on most of the contentious 
issues” ( 2014, para 2.3). This follows directly from the earlier Home Office Report (2013) 
about setting up the PRRB. Both repeat the assertion, but without evidence, of the failures 
of the PNB. The reality behind the changes remain as before: a government seeking to 
reduce pay levels and costs, reducing police federation opposition, and rebalancing the 
power relations in favour of the employers and senior managers and away from the 
workforce and the representative organisations.  
 
The timing of the announced shift to pay review was important. The PFEW were in retreat 
after the debacle of ‘Plebgate’, the shift in approach to campaigns, and the subsequent clear 
out of its leading figures (RSA 2013). It became introspective and damaged, and had little 
enthusiasm for any fight against the enforcement of Winsor through the backdoor of the 
PRRB. Andy Fittes, General Secretary, said:  
 “Our submission takes a long-term approach. This is not just about the here and 
 now, but about ensuring we are recognised as a credible organisation supplying 
 strong evidence-based submissions …not only does this take account of our 
 recognition of the public sector austerity measures set by  Government, but it 
 addresses our primary concer that there should be no further divisive pay 
 changes. Officers have had to endure much turbulence to  their pay and allowances 
 in recent years as a result of the Winsor review and we are asking that there be  no 
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 further piecemeal change to pay and conditions without proper long-term 
 evidence of its impact”.  
 
This was a far cry from the indicative ballot on the restoration of the right to strike carried 
out in early 2013 with a near 80% in favour of those voting (about 50% of the membership) 
and the heyday of attacks on government ministers. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The case of police pay is a clear example of problems associated with pay setting when the 
government of the day favours short-term economic goals over and above any long-term 
approach to staffing essential public services. In the case of the police there are added 
complexities in that they are prevented from striking and therefore de facto from being a 
party to normal collective bargaining. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the schematic view of 
developments in police pay discussed here reveal the often fraught relationship between 
rank and file police officers and the government. The tensions around pay are then 
exacerbated when the state as employer pushes down on labour costs when it can, 
legitimised by a dominant austerity narrative and in times of low inflation. Therefore, since 
2010, public sector pay has been clamped and the preferred mechanisms for pay 
determination have little to distinguish themselves from each other … indexation, Whitley, 
pay review, and ‘free’ collective bargaining. 
 
The reform of police pay has nothing to do with the police service and everything to do with 
a system of pay imposition. This may succeed pro tem in keeping the peace in a period of 
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low inflation, but it is unlikely to solve the deeper issues of public sector pay when inflation 
picks up, service provision worsens, and the institutional failings of the pay setting 
machinery are once again exposed. In this case, in the words of Steve White (PFEW chair), 
“The Government must urgently review any plans to further reduce officer numbers 
through more reductions to the police budget over the coming years.  We cannot, and must 
not, put a price on public safety” (20/11/15, PFEW circular).  
 
There are real tensions between government ministers intent on securing improved labour 
utilisation (or at least some curbs on perceived restrictive practices associated with 
overtime in particular) and the PFEW, which has historically resisted changes in work 
organisation and technological development that might impact terms and conditions. The 
added complication arises from the inability of police officers to take strike action, rendering 
police pay and how it is determined both complex and highly politicised. While the PFEW 
has sought to advance its members’ interests it has been increasingly on the back-foot with 
regard to government pay policy. A clear expression of this was the PFEW’s inability to 
seriously frustrate the Winsor findings, while the desperate measures to secure a bargaining 
chip in the Plebgate incident proved to be seriously damaging for both the federation and its 
members. The entire PFEW national leadership came under fierce scrutiny, and many 
resigned. And so, by 2014, just when the government was forcing through its decision to 
impose a Pay Review on the police, the PFEW was crippled by severe reputational damage 
among its own members as well as with the wider public. 
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